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DECLARATION ON PATENT PROTECTION 
 







 As a framework regulation for innovation markets, the patent system needs to be tailored to 
the innovation process, which it is supposed to serve, and to the competitive environment, 
within which it must operate. In order to ensure an efficient functionality of the patent system 
as an innovation policy tool, patent rights ought to be defined, justified and continually recon-
sidered by reference to their socio-economic benefits and costs.  
1 
Sovereign states should retain the discretion to adopt a patent system that best suits their tech-
nological capabilities as well as their social, cultural and economic needs and priorities, with 
the proviso that the exercise of such discretion must remain within the boundaries of interna-
tional law. Taking into account the customary principles of interpretation of international law, 
this Declaration seeks to shed light on these boundaries. The purpose is to clarify the policy 
space that the ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS 
Agreement) leaves to national legislators and judicial authorities with regard to the implemen-
tation and administration of their patent systems. 
2 
This is of particular importance when it comes to accommodating the law to changed circum-
stances. We emphasise four key premises in this regard. 
3 
First, states are faced with historically unprecedented numbers of patent filings and grants. 
Besides creating backlogs at patent offices, this phenomenon leads to patent thickets, legal 
interdependencies, market entry barriers, royalty stacking and increased litigation, all of which 
ultimately generate impediments to research and commercial applications. As a result, the 
costs of monitoring patents rise, legal certainty decreases, and the economic freedom of mar-
ket participants becomes unduly limited. This affects consumer welfare and distorts competi-
tion. Furthermore, the overall social benefits of innovation are reduced while an imbalance 
emerges between those able to cope with the resulting insecurities and related costs, such as 
multinational enterprises with their own patent departments, and those who cannot, such as 
small and medium sized enterprises or individual inventors. 
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Second, new technologies and business practices challenge the traditional paradigm of patent 
protection developed during the industrial revolution. Biotechnology, business methods and 
computer science, as well as standard-setting, strategic patenting and non-practising entities 
all affect the functioning of the patent system as a regulatory institution. 
 
Third, the role of patents in corporate management has changed. Patents are increasingly used 
as strategic assets to influence the conditions of competition rather than as a defensive means 
to protect research and development outcomes. The issue is less whether, in any given case, 
the patent does or does not serve a pro-innovation purpose (such as attracting venture capital 
or preserving the freedom to operate as opposed to blocking competitors or launching nui-
sance lawsuits). What matters is that the shift of the patent from a right of defence to a com-
mercial tool affects the manner in which the right to exclude operates in practice. 
 
Fourth, in many jurisdictions, in particular in those of industrialized states with highly devel-
oped economies and advanced technological infrastructures, there has been a gradual shift of 
balance in the patent regime towards right holders both by reducing the burdens for patent ap-
plicants (expanded scope of patentable subject matter, lower eligibility standards, reduced 
fees) and by extending the rights of patent holders (longer patent term, harsher sanctions for 
infringements, strengthened modalities of private and public enforcement). In turn, counter-
vailing rights aimed at protecting the public interest in free competition and third parties’ free-
dom to operate are rarely introduced or extended. 
 
This evolution is complicated by two further developments. On the one hand, issues of global 
governance arise as patent offices reinforce international cooperation. On the other hand, the 
patent system faces increasing friction with ancillary public policy goals, such as protecting 
the environment, preserving biodiversity or ensuring affordable access to medicines. 
4 
When the world’s major patent systems first developed into their present form, nation states 
were able to engage in the regulatory design process under conditions of high sovereign au-
tonomy. Over the past decades, this autonomy has been progressively eroded. Today, states 
face a legal and institutional regime consisting of multilateral, regional and bilateral agree-
ments, which are becoming increasingly complex and set more and more limits to their regula-
tory freedom.1 
As a result, the ability of states to maintain a proper balance between the need for protection 
of knowledge goods in global markets, the freedom to regulate national or regional innovation 
markets, and the policy space for pursuing diverse public interest goals risks becoming unduly 
constrained. This Declaration seeks to clarify some of the regulatory options states still retain 




                                                 
1 See also the Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, available at 
http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/fta_statement.cfm. 








The patent system’s primary regulatory purpose is to prevent the market from fail-
ing to produce technical knowledge at adequate levels. The overriding rationale is 
that, absent patent protection, there may be insufficient incentives to invent (i.e. to 
invest in research and development) and to innovate (i.e. to exploit the commercial 
opportunities a new invention makes possible), because others cannot be excluded 
from appropriating the benefits without sharing the costs. Patents have also been 
regarded as serving a number of other objectives, such as attracting foreign invest-
ment, facilitating technology transfer and dissemination, supporting domestic indus-
tries, generating trade gains or avoiding trade losses. Yet, the impact of patents on 
the level of innovation strongly depends on the level of technological and economic 
development, prevailing in the country where they are granted. 
A suboptimal innovation rate may have a number of causes, but it is not necessarily 
proof of a market failure that can be attributed to absent or insufficient patent pro-
tection. Patents as such do not create innovation incentives. They respond to incen-
tives that result from market opportunities, which patentees may or may not capture 
by virtue of their exclusive rights. Patents thus enable right holders to monetise giv-
en market opportunities without interference by others. However, they entail no en-
titlement for the patentees to be actually compensated for their efforts or to obtain 
any given return on their investments. 
1 
 
The proper functioning of the patent system depends on the existence of open and 
effective competition on the market. Patent protection must not interfere with dy-
namic competition as a decentralised discovery procedure for innovation opportuni-
ties, and as a price-setting mechanism for innovation rewards.  
2 
The patent system’s overall acceptance rests on a delicate interplay of privileges and 
responsibilities. As a regulatory institution, its operation must also accommodate 
other public policies and interests, such as environmental protection, biological di-
versity, health care (including managing the risks of pandemics), nutrition, food 
security, technological and scientific progress, education and security. 
3 
The establishment of (see infra paras 9 et seq.), and limitations to (see infra paras 20 
et seq.), patent protection are thus two sides of the same coin, both committed to 
promoting competition in innovation while at the same time ensuring that other so-
cio-economic interests are duly safeguarded. As integral elements of patent govern-
ance, limitations are crucial to the overall balance of the system of protection – not 
merely an option that may be used ad libitum. 
4 
On that note, Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement recognize that the patent 
system is embedded in a framework of policy controls. Within the ambit of these 
provisions, states should possess a high degree of discretion in regulating domestic 
innovation markets while pursuing public interest goals.  
 
5 
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Even if the measures adopted in connection with the exercise of that discretion cur-
tail the exclusive rights of the patent holder as mandated by Article 28 of the 
Agreement, that does not make them ‘incompatible with the provisions of the 
Agreement’ (cf. Article 8(1) and (2)), as long as they are reasonable and necessary 
in the light of the objectives pursued and the interests involved. In this connection, it 
bears emphasising that Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement expressly grants WTO 
Members the freedom to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of the Agreement in their own legal systems and practice. 
    
Differentiation Since it is not the patent but the market that creates innovation opportunities and 
provides for innovation rewards, patent protection must be neutral in its effects on 
competition. Both insufficient and excessive protection prejudice the operation of 
the market. Underprotection undermines the incentives to exploit innovation oppor-
tunities. Overprotection compromises other market participants’ freedom to operate 
and compete on the merits. In either case, the patent system causes a distortion of 
competition in that it prevents an efficient allocation of market revenues according 
to the competitive performance of market actors. 
6 
Every technology is more or less unique with regard to its exposure to market fail-
ure, its susceptibility to patent protection, and its socio-economic implications. It 
follows that the demand for legal protection, and the effects of that protection on 
both the operation of competition and the attainment of other public policy goals 
(see supra para. 3), may differ according to the technology at issue. The need to 
grant protection and the modalities of such protection may also differ accordingly. 
Measures to accommodate these differences cannot be considered contrary to Arti-
cle 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. While that provision prohibits discrimination as 
to the field of technology, it does not prevent states from treating different situations 
differently. Differentiation that serves to level the actual conditions of competition 
across all fields of technology is not discriminatory but rather the opposite. It consti-
tutes a necessary response to the diversity of technologies and, consequently, a con-
ditio sine qua non for an intrinsically balanced system of protection that remains 
neutral in its effects on competition. 
7 
Differentiation may relate to the requirements of patentability, patent eligibility and 
disclosure (see infra paras 12 et seq.), to the exclusion of subject matter from pa-
tentability, as well as to the scope of protection (see infra paras 17 et seq.). With 
specific regard to limitations of protection as set out in Articles 30 and 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement (see infra paras 21 et seq.), the non-discrimination principle does 
not apply at all. Contrary to what a WTO’s DSB panel mistakenly assumed (cf. 
WT/DS114/R of 17 March 2000), the Agreement does not subject these provisions 
to Article 27(1) of the Agreement. The principle of in dubio mitius precludes an 
interpretation to that effect. When designing exceptions and compulsory licences, 
states thus remain free to discriminate with regard to the field of technology, pro-
vided that such action is reasonable in the light of other public policy goals. 
8 
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Patent protection is only available for ‘inventions’ (see infra para. 10). Certain in-
ventions may be excluded from protection because they do not constitute ‘patenta-
ble inventions’, such as those whose commercial exploitation is in conflict with or-
dre public or morality. Patentable inventions may otherwise be denied protection 
because they do not fulfil the ‘requirements of eligibility’ (see infra para. 11), in-
cluding the disclosure prerequisites (see infra para. 12). 
9 
Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement requires states to provide patent protection 
for ‘any inventions […] in all fields of technology’. In the absence of codified or 
customary international consensus, states have latitude in which to define these 
terms. They are not required to provide protection for subject matter that they classi-
fy as discoveries rather than inventions, such as, arguably,  
- biological material, e.g. genes, native plant traits or certain microorganisms, in-
cluding their components and derivatives; 
- biological processes; 
- new forms, properties or uses of known inventions (see also infra para. 11). 
By the same token, states are not required to provide patent protection for inventions 
that they do not consider to be of a technical nature, such as, arguably, business 
methods or computer programs.  
Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from limiting the 
availability of patent protection to ‘technical’ inventions. Indeed, most jurisdictions 
have traditionally defined inventions as comprising ‘technical aspects’, solving a 
‘technical problem’ or exhibiting a ‘technical effect’. 
10 
Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement requires states to provide protection for any 
inventions that are not a priori excluded from patentability, provided that they are 
‘new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application’. States 
enjoy considerable discretion in implementing these requirements. They may, for 
example, deny product and/or process patents for  
- biological material, even if it has been isolated and purified; 
- new forms of known products or substances, such as variations in chemical 
composition (‘derivatives’); 
- new properties or uses of known products or substances, such as second or fur-
ther medical uses of pharmaceutical substances; 
- selections of elements or segments from a known group or class of patented 
compounds (‘selection inventions’).  
If states grant protection to new properties, uses or derivatives of known substances, 
they are not prevented from doing that only under qualified conditions, such as en-
hanced efficacy or reduced side-effects of that substance. In any case, protection 
should only be available for the newly discovered form, property or use, but not in 
relation to the substance as such, since a product patent would arguably be unavail-
able for lack of novelty. Similarly, states may condition the patentability of isolated 
biological material on their having undergone a structural change (e.g. by genetic 
engineering) that altered their functions or their interaction with other substances.  
11 
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According to Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement, patent protection may only be 
granted if the invention has been disclosed in a manner sufficiently clear and com-
plete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. That person must be able 
to carry out the invention without any additional information other than that provid-
ed in the patent application. This provision means that different modalities and 
thresholds of disclosure may need to be applied depending on the technology at is-
sue. For example, patent applications concerning computer programs may require 
the disclosure of the source code, and those concerning biotechnological inventions 
may require the deposit of biological material. 
When an invention is not effectively disclosed within the meaning of Article 29 of 
the Agreement or when the application relates to unspecific or speculative embodi-
ments of the invention, the grant of a patent may not only harm innovation and un-
duly affect competition, it will also constitute a violation of international law. 
12 
In this connection, the person skilled in the art for whom disclosure must be suffi-
ciently clear and complete is not necessarily the same person for whom the inven-
tion must be new and nonobvious. Whereas the latter may be defined as a recog-
nized expert – or a team of experts – with extensive practical know-how, the former 
may be defined as an average engineer with average skills and experience. 
13 
The non-discrimination principle in Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement does not 
prevent states from adapting the subject matter and requirements of patentability to 
the characteristics inherent in the technology at issue. They may, for example, apply 
- a different demarcation line between inventions and discoveries in different 
fields of technology; 
- different standards of novelty, non-obviousness and disclosure depending on 
the technology’s maturity and dissemination. 
These options would constitute instances of legitimate bona fide differentiation ra-
ther than discrimination within the meaning of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agree-
ment (see supra paras 6 et seq.). 
14 
A rigorous policy towards patentability does not mean that knowledge goods that do 
not meet the eligibility criteria under patent law must remain without protection. 
Provided that a lack of protection would lead to market failure (see supra para. 1), 
states remain free to adopt alternative approaches to incentivizing innovation. For 
example, instead of conferring upon the inventor a right to exclude, they may grant 
him or her a right of remuneration (after a certain period of market exclusivity). 
15 
    
Scope of  
Protection 
In most jurisdictions, the scope of protection is determined by the patent claims, 
read in conjunction with the description and drawings. Accordingly, the exclusive 
rights conferred by the patent relate to all forms of use that are covered by the 
claims. In most cases, this approach creates no further problems, because technical 
inventions usually serve a rather specific and clearly defined purpose. In some cas-
es, however, it may lead to overprotection. Where an invention can have multiple 
uses or functions not all of which may be known or expected at the time the patent 
is granted, there is a potential lack of causality between the rationale of patent pro-
16 
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tection and the extent of that protection. Affording ‘absolute product protection’ (i.e. 
for all possible uses, purposes or functions of the invention, whether known or un-
known at that time) may unduly restrict competition beyond what is necessary to 
prevent market failure (see supra para. 1).  
Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement do not prevent States from limiting the 
scope of protection to those uses, purposes or functions that have been disclosed and 
expressly claimed in the patent (‘purpose-bound protection’). Such a limitation may 
only be applied in certain fields of technology or for certain categories of inventions 
whose range of application is particularly wide and unpredictable (typically chemi-
cal compounds, gene sequences and other ‘information products’). Again, this 
would constitute a legitimate differentiation rather than discrimination within the 
meaning of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement (see supra paras 6 et seq.). 
17 
    
Exhaustion Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement specifies that, ‘for the purposes of dispute settle-
ment ... nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaus-
tion of intellectual property rights’. In other words, it has been agreed to disagree. 
Some states apply international exhaustion (i.e. the patent rights are exhausted once 
the product has been placed on the market by the patent holder or another authorised 
party, such as a voluntary or compulsory licensee, in any part of the world), others 
have opted for national or regional exhaustion. Article 28 of the Agreement should 
not be misconstrued to undermine this agreement to disagree by interpreting the 
exclusive right to import as an obstacle to the principle of international exhaustion.  
18 
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from differentiating and 
even discriminating between industries or fields of technology with regard to the 
scope of exhaustion. This approach can be of particular relevance with regard to the 
issue of international exhaustion. Some industries may be more prone to parallel 
imports than others; and some may depend more on price differentiation than others. 
States remain free to apply the concept of exhaustion that they expect to be most 
favourable for the development of the industry in the field of technology concerned. 
19 
    
Exceptions to 
Exclusivity 
By applying appropriate thresholds of patentability (see supra paras 9 et seq.) and 
properly relating the scope of protection to the merit of the invention (see supra 
paras 16 et seq.), states may reduce the risk of unnecessarily restricting access to 
technical knowledge. In addition, they may exempt certain purposes and forms of 
use from the coverage of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, e.g. 
- for experimental purposes; 
- for private and/or non-commercial purposes; 
- for educational purposes; 
- to obtain marketing approval (regulatory review or ‘Bolar’ exception); 
- to prepare or facilitate the sale of competing products immediately after the pa-
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Occasionally, an exception for certain purposes and forms of use can be a credible 
policy alternative to restricting patentability. Methods of medical treatment may, for 
example, be excluded from patentability from the outset or, alternatively, may be 
exempted in relation to medical practitioners. Similarly, where the rights conferred 
by a patent are restricted to commercial use from the outset, there will be no need 
for a private, non-commercial use exception; and where novelty is also destroyed by 
non-public use, there is no need for prior user rights.  
21 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes three criteria that must be met in 
order for an exception to be consistent with the Agreement (‘three-step test’):  
- the exception must be limited,  
- it must not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and  
- it must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent holder, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. 
Contrary to what a panel of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body seemed to assume 
(cf. WT/DS114/R of 17 March 2000), the three conditions are not cumulative. The 
three-step test may be understood to require a comprehensive overall assessment 
rather than a separate and independent assessment of each criterion. Failure to com-
ply with one of the three conditions need not result in the exception being disal-
lowed.2 
22 
In order to be ‘limited’, an exception must not necessarily be narrow in effect. It is 
limited within the meaning of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement if the scope of the 
exception is reasonably proportionate to its objective and purpose. It must fulfil a 
legitimate purpose, be adequate to achieve that purpose, and not exceed what is nec-
essary and sufficient to achieve it. 
23 
An exception ‘unreasonably conflicts with the normal exploitation of the patent’ if it 
undermines its functional efficiency as a price-setting mechanism. This is the case 
when it unduly curtails the innovation rewards provided by the market. 
24 
An exception does not ‘unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests’ if it is both pro-
portionate and reasonable. In this context, it must consider all interests involved, 
including those of 
- the patent holder and his or her actual and potential licensees; 
- follow-on inventors; 
- competitors and other market actors who need to operate on the market under 
conditions of effective competition; 
- scientific and academic researchers who require access to the findings of basic 
research; 
- consumers enjoying the benefits of technological advancement; 




                                                 
2 See also the Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-Step Test’ in Copyright Law 
(2006), available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/declaration-threesteptest.cfm. 
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Against this background, and in contrast to what the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
has decided in the past (cf. WT/DS114/R of 17 March 2000), even prima facie ‘un-
limited’ exceptions such as the stockpiling of generic medicines prior to expiry of 
the relevant patents, can be considered compatible with Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, as long as the principle of proportionality is respected and all affected 
interests are taken into consideration. 
26 
    
Compulsory 
Licence 
Not all conflicts of interest between those who benefit from patent protection and 
those who may be adversely affected by it, including competitors, consumers and 
ultimately the general public, can be solved by an ex ante determination of the scope 
of exclusive rights and exceptions thereto. In order to accommodate important pub-
lic interests and confine exclusivity within reasonable limits during the entire life-
time of a patent, states must be able to adjust the scope of exclusive rights even after 
the patent has been granted. 
27 
The discretion of states to make use of compulsory licences as regulatory instru-
ments is ensured by the fact that neither Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement nor 
Article 5A of the Paris Convention contains any restriction with regard to the 
grounds on which a compulsory licence may be issued. 
28 
In general, two kinds of compulsory licences may be distinguished: those that serve 
to maintain the functional efficiency of the system of protection (see supra para. 1 et 
seq.), and those that serve to accommodate other public interests (see supra para. 3). 
Compulsory licences ensure an efficient operation of innovation markets by avoid-
ing the risk that patents themselves become barriers to invention and innovation. 
This includes the issuance of compulsory licences for improvement patents (i.e. 
when a later patent cannot be exploited without infringing an earlier patent), for 
enabling the use of biotechnological inventions as research tools or as a remedy 
against abuse or other inappropriate conduct by the patent holder. 
As policy tools, compulsory licences help to ensure that patent protection remains 
properly balanced with other socio-economic interests. Compulsory licences in the 
public interest may, for example, be granted when the demand for the patented in-
vention is not being met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms or when, by 
reason of a refusal of the patent holder to grant a voluntary licence, the establish-
ment or development of domestic industries is prejudiced. 
29 
A compulsory licence may also be granted if the patent holder fails to work the pa-
tent within the territory of protection. Since the non-discrimination principle of Ar-
ticle 27 of the TRIPS Agreement – namely the prohibition to discriminate as to 
whether products are imported or locally produced – does not apply to Article 31 of 
the Agreement (see supra para. 8), states remain free to implement ‘local working 
requirements’. However, since such requirements are in some tension with the eco-
nomic rationale of patent protection on globalising markets and need to be recon-
ciled with the WTO’s overarching principle of free trade, states may wish to make 
the grant of a compulsory licence subject to additional requirements (e.g. that the 
patent holder has been given sufficient time to make preparations for local produc-
30 
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tion and that a compulsory licence is a proportionate measure to accommodate the 
interests at stake). A compulsory licence may however not be granted if the patent 
holder can justify his or her inaction (cf. Article 5A of the Paris Convention). 
 Despite the strong regulatory autonomy of states with regard to determining the 
grounds on which compulsory licences may be issued, their actual use may be lim-
ited in practice. Due to an overly restrictive implementation of the procedural mo-
dalities set out in Article 31(a) to (l) of the TRIPS Agreement, the disciplinary effect 
on the patent holder is often negligible. This may induce him or her to exploit his or 
her bargaining position in voluntary licence negotiations in ways that may harm the 
public interest. The procedural requirements must thus be calibrated so as to avoid 
an excessive burden for the licence petitioner.  
31 
 In order to level the playing field, states may reverse the burden of proof concerning 
the existence of an obligation to licence, and they may give immediate effect to a 
compulsory licence pending administrative or judicial review (cf. Article 31(i) and 
(j) of the TRIPS Agreement).  
In determining the scope and duration of a compulsory licence (cf. Article 31(c) of 
the TRIPS Agreement) states should take into account the commercial interests of 
licensees. A compulsory licensee should not be deprived of the possibility of obtain-
ing reasonable compensation and an adequate return on investments. Otherwise, he 
or she will have no incentive to apply for a compulsory licence in the first place. 
This may require extending the scope and duration of a compulsory licence beyond 
what would actually be necessary and sufficient in the light of the circumstances 
which led to it. By the same token, Article 31(g) of the Agreement does not mandate 
the termination of a compulsory licence on the sole ground that the circumstances 
on the basis of which it was granted have ceased to exist. 
32 
 In the case of a compulsory licence granted as a remedy against abuse or other inap-
propriate conduct, it is not required that the proposed licensee engage in prior nego-
tiations with the patent holder (cf. Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement) or that the 
licence be authorised predominantly for the supply of the domestic market (cf. Arti-
cle 31(f) of the Agreement). Given the nature of patents as means of competition 
(see supra para. 1 et seq.), any illegitimate exploitation of the exclusive rights con-
ferred by the patent, whether specifically addressed by competition law (such as e.g. 
tying and bundling, discrimination, restrictions of output, excessive pricing or mar-
ket leveraging) or condemned by some other law (such as patent law itself, civil 
law, tort law, administrative or procedural law), may be considered ‘anti-
competitive’ within the meaning of Article 31(k) of the Agreement. In fact, states 
frequently address concerns of competition by laws other than those of antitrust. 
33 
    
Government 
Use 
The rationale behind government or Crown use lies in the responsibility of the state 
towards its citizenry and its obligation to step in where the market alone becomes 
incapable of providing essential public goods. It is the state that grants patent pro-
tection in the first place, so it is up to the state to eventually limit that protection if it 
turns out to conflict with the attainment of other public policy goals.  
34 
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Despite the strict disclosure requirements in Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
information actually contained in a patent alone is often insufficient to enable others 
to practice the invention. Third parties thus depend on additional know-how that 
only the patent holder possesses. This is of particular importance when the third 
party has no contractual relationship with the patent holder that entitles it to a trans-
fer of know-how, as in the case of a compulsory licence. In such cases, authorities 
may impose an obligation on the patent holder to provide the licensee – where ap-
propriate in exchange for an adequate compensation – with know-how that is need-
ed to exploit the protected invention. Access to such know-how may only be denied 
if the balance of hardships tips towards the patent holder as a result of overriding 
confidentiality reasons within the purview of Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
35 
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement may prohibit the disclosure of clinical test data 
to third parties, including the generic company, but it does not prevent these parties 
from relying on that data in order to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a bioe-
quivalent generic. Consequently, authorities may process market approval applica-
tions for generic drugs even before the expiry of the originator’s patents. 
36 
    
Enforcement The decision whether or not to grant injunctive relief, permanent or preliminary, is 
an act of equitable discretion by the competent authority. In exercising this discre-
tion, account should be taken of all the interests at stake (i.e. not only those of the 
patent holder and the alleged infringer, but also those of licensees, business partners, 
competitors, customers, consumers and ultimately the general public) and the cir-
cumstances of the individual case, such as  
- the economic consequences of the envisaged remedy for the parties at issue; 
- the intentional or unintentional character of the infringement; 
- the contribution of the infringing technology to the market value of the end 
product in which it is incorporated; 
- whether the interests of the plaintiff are of exclusionary or pecuniary nature. 
37 
 The conditions for the grant of provisional measures need to be carefully scrutinised 
to avoid their abuse and unwarranted limitations to legitimate trade. Establishing the 
validity and coverage of patent claims and the possible existence of an infringement 
requires technical knowledge that judges are not generally in possession of. The 
cautious judicial approach towards provisional measures applied in many countries 
provides useful guidance on this matter.  
The alleged infringer should normally be allowed to articulate his or her defence. 
Granting relief inaudita altera parte, i.e. without prior hearing of the other side, 
should remain the exception. In principle, a provisional measure should not be 
granted unless the harm caused to the patent holder is higher than the harm that 
could be caused to the alleged infringer if the measure were wrongly granted. Fur-
thermore, the public interest should not be negatively affected. Article 50 of the 
TRIPS Agreement provides ample room for countries to determine the conditions 
under which their judicial authorities may grant provisional measures. 
 
38 
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 The procedural modalities of Article 31(a) to (l) of the TRIPS Agreement do not 
apply to denials of injunctive relief, even if the effect is essentially the same as that 
of a compulsory licence (i.e. when injunctive relief is tied to the payment of ongoing 
royalties by the infringer). 
39 
Transit Patent rights should not create barriers to legitimate trade (cf. Recital 1 of the Pre-
amble and Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement). Goods in transit cannot be deemed 
to infringe any of the exclusive rights that a patent normally confers if those goods 
are not destined for the market of the country where transit occurs. The territoriality 
principle applicable under patent law has not been overridden by the TRIPS Agree-
ment (see, for example, Paragraph 6(i) in fine of the 30 August 2003 WTO decision 
on the ‘Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health’, concerning the export of pharmaceutical products 
produced or imported under a compulsory licence). Customs authorities and courts 
of the country of transit usually lack competence to determine whether goods in 
transit are infringing in the countries of origin or destination and cannot decide to 
grant preliminary or permanent injunctions in their respect.  
The detention of goods by customs authorities based on claims of infringement can 




The scope of a patent depends on the interpretation of its claims, which is conducted 
under various theories and approaches by courts in different countries. Uncertainty 
often exists about the scope of exclusive rights conferred and the validity of the pa-
tent itself. Applying criminal law in these circumstances can discourage legitimate 
activities and block legitimate trade. The TRIPS Agreement does not require the 
criminalization of patent infringement. Infringers should only be subject to civil 















observing that states have often not taken full advantage of the regulatory discre-
tion available under international law, notably the TRIPS Agreement; 
perceiving an increasing limitation of national regulatory sovereignty in the field of 
patent law as a result of obligations arising from multilateral, regional and bilateral 
agreements; 
recalling that the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention are both part of, and 
should be interpreted in the light of, a wider set of international rules and princi-
ples, including regimes dealing with human rights and biological diversity; 
recalling that the patent system should ultimately serve the public good by foster-
ing economic growth and technological progress for the benefit of society as a 
whole; 
stressing, in the light of the foregoing, the need for legal certainty regarding the ob-
ligations that international law imposes on states, and the policy space that it leaves 
to them, in formulating and administering their domestic patent systems; 
 





The TRIPS Agreement preserves the right of states to determine the goals of their 
own patent systems, and to adopt measures ensuring that 
- competition is not restricted beyond what is necessary and sufficient to prevent 
market failure, and 
- the pursuit of other equally or more important public policies is not unduly en-
cumbered. 
1.1 
   
In particular, states are not prevented from taking measures to 
- maintain a proper balance between patent protection and principles of competi-
tion, including measures against abuses of patent rights or other inappropriate 
conduct by patent holders and applicants; 
- provide their population with essential public goods, such as environmental 
protection, biological diversity, health care, nutrition, food security, technologi-
cal and scientific progress, education and security. 
1.2 
   
Such measures are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement – within the meaning of 
Article 8(1) and (2) of that Agreement – to the extent that they are necessary and 
reasonable in the light of the objectives pursued and the interests involved. 
1.3 
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Differentiation Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from reasonably differ-
entiating between fields of technology according to 
- the characteristics inherent in the technology at issue and  
- the state’s public policies pertaining to the sector at issue. 
2 
    
    
Patentability, 
Disclosure 
States have latitude to define what constitutes patentable inventions. Article 27 of 
the TRIPS Agreement does not require states to provide patent protection for sub-
ject matter that they 
- classify as discoveries rather than as inventions or 
- do not consider to be technical in nature. 
3.1 
   
States have latitude to determine how the patentability requirements are interpreted 
and applied. In particular, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent 
states from denying patent protection for 
- new uses of known products or substances; 
- derivatives of known products or substances; 
- selection inventions 
otherwise lacking novelty and/or an inventive step. 
3.2 
   
States are not required to provide patent protection for inventions that have not been 
sufficiently disclosed and expressly claimed in the patent application.  
3.3 
  
States are not prevented from making the grant of a patent subject to revealing the 
origin of claimed biological material and associated traditional knowledge. 
3.4 
   
   
Scope of  
Protection 
Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement do not prevent states from limiting the 
protection conferred by a patent to products or processes in relation only to the 
specific function(s) of the invention expressly claimed in the patent. 
4 
   
   
Exhaustion Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from determining wheth-
er patent rights are to be exhausted nationally, regionally or internationally. 
5.1 
  
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from discriminating 
among fields of technology with regard to the geographical scope of exhaustion. 
5.2 
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Exceptions to 
the Scope  
of Protection 
The non-discrimination principle set out in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement does 
not apply to exceptions otherwise permissible under Article 30. 
6.1 
  
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement constitutes an indivisible entirety. The ‘three 
steps’ are to be considered together and as a whole in a comprehensive overall 
assessment.3 
6.2 
   
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement does not  
- limit the grounds for introducing exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by 
a patent; 
- prevent legislatures from introducing open-ended general exceptions, as long as 
the scope of such exceptions is reasonably foreseeable;  
- prevent courts from applying existing statutory exceptions to similar factual 
circumstances mutatis mutandis; 
- require exceptions to be interpreted narrowly; they are to be interpreted accord-
ing to their objectives and purposes. 
6.3 
   
Exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent if 
they  
- are based on important competing public policy considerations or  
- have the effect of countering unreasonable impediments to the operation of 
markets (notably secondary markets). 
6.4 
   
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement does not require states to take account of patent 
holders’ interests that exceed the purpose of preventing market failure.  
Legitimate interests of third parties include those of 
- follow-on innovation; 
- competitors and other market actors;  
- scientific research; 
- consumers; 
- the public at large.  
6.5 
    
    
Compulsory 
Licence 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the grounds on which a compul-
sory licence can be granted. 
7.1 
   
The non-discrimination principle in Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement does not 




                                                 
3 See also the Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-Step Test’ in Copyright Law 
(2006), available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/declaration-threesteptest.cfm. 
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In particular, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from 
granting a compulsory licence if the patented product is not manufactured or the 
process is not used within the territory of protection, subject to the requirements of 
Article 5A of the Paris Convention. 
7.3 
  
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from 
- requiring, in appropriate cases, the patent holder to prove that the conditions for 
a compulsory licence are not met; 
- giving immediate effect to a compulsory licence pending administrative or ju-
dicial review, provided that adequate protection of the legitimate interests of 
the patent holder is assured. 
7.4 
  
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not require the limitation of a compulsory 
licence to a degree that would unduly impede reasonable and good-faith invest-
ments of the licensee. In appropriate cases, states are not prevented from 
- determining the scope of a compulsory licence beyond what is specifically re-
quired to eliminate the circumstances which led to it; or 
- ordering the continuance of a compulsory licence even though the circumstanc-
es which led to it have ceased to exist and are unlikely to recur. 
7.5 
  
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from granting a compul-
sory licence as a remedy against the abuse of patent rights or for practices that un-
reasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology, 
even when 
- the proposed licensee has not made prior efforts to obtain authorization from 
the patent holder, and 
- the use is authorised predominantly for the supply of foreign markets. 
7.6 
  
The system set out in the WTO decision of 30 August 2003 and in the proposed 
Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement does not affect the independent right of a state 
to allow exports under Article 31(k) or within the confines of Article 31(f) of that 
Agreement. 
7.7 
    
    
Government 
Use 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the grounds on which govern-
ment use of patents can be authorised. 
8.1 
  
In implementing the government use of a patent, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment does not require any third party, such as a subcontractor, acting under the 
authority of the government, to operate on a non-profit basis. 
8.2 
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Articles 31 and 39 of the TRIPS Agreement do not prevent the authority granting a 
compulsory licence from requiring the patent holder, in appropriate cases, to pro-
vide the compulsory licensee with knowledge that is necessary, in the light of the 
purpose for which the licence was granted, to effectively work the patent, provided 




Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent states from authorising a third 
party, including a compulsory licensee, to rely on or use clinical data submitted by 




Articles 28 and 39 of the TRIPS Agreement do not prevent states from relying on 
clinical data submitted by originator companies in order to process market approval 
applications for generic products prior to the expiry of the relevant patent. 
    
    
Enforcement Articles 44 and 50 of the TRIPS Agreement do not require the authority finding an 
infringement to grant injunctive relief. An injunction may be inappropriate when  
- the legitimate interests of parties may be adversely affected; 
- it is contrary to the public interest; 
- the legitimate interests of the patent holder can be protected by other means, 
such as damages or security; 
- in the case of preliminary relief, the patent holder is unlikely to prevail in estab-
lishing validity or infringement. 
10.1 
    
 Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement does not require the grant of provisional 
measures without prior hearing of the other party. If granted, an opportunity for 
review of the decision shall be given pursuant to Article 50(4) of the Agreement. 
10.2 
    
 States are not prevented from denying injunctive relief to prevent or control abuse 
or other inappropriate conduct by the patent holder. 
10.3 
    
    
Transit Goods in transit are 
- not subject to border measures under the TRIPS Agreement; 
- outside the scope of the patent holder’s rights as defined in Article 28 of that 
Agreement, 
subject to the principle of freedom of transit under Article V of the GATT. 
11 
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Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement does not require states to apply criminal proce-
dures and penalties to cases other than those of wilful trademark counterfeiting and 






















SUPPORTING THE DECLARATION 
 
If you want to sign the declaration as a supporter, please send us your name (includ-
ing title), affiliation and function to patentdeclaration@ip.mpg.de. 
 
This Declaration is conceived as a ‘living document’. If you have a suggestion for 
improving it, or if you feel that we are missing or misinterpreting anything, we 
would love to hear from you.  
 
Please send us your thoughts to patentdeclaration@ip.mpg.de. 
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